Epistémologie

dans un ordre systématique on pourra aborder les textes suivants qui seront mis sur Arche au fur à mesure.

Brown, James R., 1986, “Thought Experiments since the Scientific Revolution”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1: 1–15.

Norton, J . : 1996, “Are Thought Experiments Just What You Thought?”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 26: 333–366.

Nersessian N. 1993: “In the Theoretician’s Laboratory: Thought Experimenting as Mental Modeling” in Hull et al. (eds.) 1993, pp. 291-301.  

Bishop M.A. 1999: “Why Thought Experiments Are Not Arguments”, in Philosophy of Science 66, pp. 534-541. 

Bunzl M. 1996: „The Logic of Thought Experiments“, in Synthese, 106, pp. 227-240. 

Norton, J . 2004 : “Why Thought Experiments Do Not Transcend Empiricism”, in C. Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science, Oxford: Blackwell, 44–66.

Stuart, Michael T. 2016. Norton and the Logic of Thought Experiments. Axiomathes (2016) 26:451–466.

Arthur R. 1999: “On thought experiments as a priori science”, in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 13, pp. 215-229. 

Atkinson D. 2003: „Experiments and Thought Experiments in Natural Science“, in M.C. Galavotti (ed.), Observation and Experiment in the Natural and Social Sciences, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 209-225.

Atkinson D. and Peijnenburg J. 2004: “Galileo and prior philosophy”, in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 35, pp. 115-136.

Stöltzner M. 2002: “The Dynamics of Thought Experiments – Comments to Atkinson”, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/documents/disks0/00/00/06/26, 17.12.2002. 

McAllister J. 1996: “The Evidential Significance of Thought Experiments in Science”, in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 27, pp. 233-250.  Souder L. 2003: “What Are We to Think about Thought Experiments?”, in Argumentation, 17, pp. 203-217.

Peijnenberg J. and Atkinson D. 2003: “When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones?”, in Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 34, pp. 305-322.